Loneliness Kindle Edition

Dr. Mijuskovic’s second edition of Loneliness is now available on Kindle at an amazing price of only $3.99. This is a must have for students of philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, 20th century literature and psychology.

See the review by Kerrin A. Jacobs Review of Loneliness on Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, and Benedetta Romano’s Review of Feeling Lonesome for more information about this work that masterfully weaves a tapestry of philosophical, psychological and literary aspects of the fundamental human condition.


Review of Loneliness on Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review

I published a book review for Dr. Ben Mijuskovic’s new book Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. It is a terrific work that handles the history, philosophy, and psychology of loneliness as only Dr. Mijuskovic can.

New Book on Loneliness by Ben Mijuskovic

Loneliness is much more than just feeling sad or isolated. It is the ultimate ground source of unhappiness-the underlying reality of all negative human behavior that manifests as anxiety, depression, envy, guilt, hostility, or shame. It underlies aggression, domestic violence, murder, PTSD, suicide, and other serious issues. This book explains why the drive to avoid loneliness and secure intimacy is the most powerful psychological need in all human beings; documents how human beings gravitate between two motivational poles: loneliness and intimacy; and advocates for an understanding of loneliness through the principles of idealism, rationalism, and insight. Readers will understand the underlying theory of consciousness that explains why people are lonely, thereby becoming better equipped to recognize sources of loneliness in themselves as well as others. Written by a licensed social worker and former mental health therapist, the book documents why whenever individuals or groups feel lonely, alienated, estranged, disenfranchised, or rejected, they will either withdraw within and shut down, or they will attack others with little thought of consequence to either themselves or others. Perhaps most importantly, the work identifies the antidotes to loneliness as achieving a sense of belonging, togetherness, and intimacy through empathic emotional attachments, which come from a mutual sharing of “lived experiences” such as feelings, meanings, and values; constant positive communication; and equal decision making.

Order your copy from Amazon or other major retailers.

Review of Loneliness by Ben Mijuskovic

We are appreciative for Kerrin A. Jacobs’s complementary review of Loneliness for Metapsychology Online Reviews:

In summary, Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature is a memorable book which certainly appeals a philosophically inclined audience. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic thoughtfully and stringently develops his hypotheses, which are very often remarkably clear, presented against a delicately rich and complex theoretical background. Mijuskovic rewards the reader with thought-provoking moments and invites one to further reflect the critical potential and actuality of his theory in the light of the most recent theories of an embodied, embedded, enacted and extended mind.

Click here to read the full review.

Loneliness 2nd Edition is now available

Dr. Mijuskovic’s interdisciplinary work Loneliness is now available in a second edition. You can find it on  Alibris, Amazon and Barnes & Noble.

Parker E. Lichtenstein provides a helpful synopsis in The Psychological Record:

  “The author has employed an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of loneliness. While psychologists have touched upon the problem, they have not done justice to it. Mijuskovic sees loneliness not simply as a frequent human condition but rather an aspect of man’s ontological being. In his words, man is ‘intrinsically alone and irredeemably lost’ and is ‘continually struggling to escape the solipsistic prison of his frightening solitude.’ This basic thesis is supported through philosophical analysis and wide-ranging examination of relevant literature…. [T]he author has presented a challenging picture of much human behavior as a flight from loneliness. On the whole this is an intriguing book which should be of particular interest to psychologists of a humanistic persuasion.”

(It is an honor to post a piece by Dr. Ben Mijuskovic in response to the first chapter of Lennon and Stainton’s work.  Any comments or remarks will be directed to his attention for response.)

The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology (hereafter ARP) distinguishes two forms of the Achilles argument, a Narrow version, which addresses the issue of the unity of consciousness; and a Broad form, which concentrates on the immortality of the soul.

The first article in the study, authored by Professor Karen Margrethe Nielsen, titled “Did Plato Articulate the Achilles Argument?” asks “whether the Achilles can be found in Plato’s Phaedo, or anywhere else in the Platonic corpus” [ARP, 22]. As I understand Professor Nielsen’s position, she believes that Plotinus is the original source and in confirmation she refers to Moses Mendelssohn’s dialogue of the same name in support pointing out that if indeed Plato was the first source, then surely Mendelssohn would have cited Plato instead of drawing heavily on Plotinus and his arguments.

In my own study, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (ARA), I indicate that its origin could be traced back to the Phaedo. In support of this assertion, I discuss at some length the views of A. E. Taylor, who “warns against what he considers to be the anachronistic consequences in inferring that Plato’s argument proves the soul to be a ‘simple substance.’” Nevertheless, Taylor goes on to state that Plato’s reasoning in the Phaedo:

lies at the bottom of all the familiar arguments of later metaphysicians who deduce the immortality of the soul from its alleged character as a ‘simple’ substance,’ the ‘paralogism’ attacked by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason . . . Socrates point is not that the soul is a ‘simple substance,’—he had not so much the language in which to say such a thing—but that it is, as the Orphic religion had taught, something divine. Its ‘deiformity,’ not its indivisibility is what he is anxious to establish; the indivisibility is a mere consequence. [ARA, p. 6]

Taylor himself remarks that Kant’s knowledge of the proof derives from Christian Wolff and Moses Mendelssohn [ARA, p. 6]. Perhaps. The first edition second paralogism treats the unity of consciousness but the second edition paralogism primarily deals with immortality.

By contrast, I also state that F. M. Cornford contends that Plato proves the soul to be simple because: “As immortal and imperishable, the soul is most like the divine, immortal, intelligible, simple, and indissoluble (because incomposite); whereas the body is most like the mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble (because composite) and perpetually changing” [ARA, pp. 6-7]. So I do consider the controversy over the attribution to Plato of the Broad Achilles. To suggest otherwise is somewhat misleading. Thus, I would say that it is a bit strong to say that, “Ben Mijuskovic nevertheless identifies Plato’s Phaedo as its first locus” [ARP, pp. 23 and 24]. In fact, my opening statement reads: “The argument seems to be first suggested as a proof for immortality in Plato’s Phaedo” [ARA p. 6].

At bottom, her conclusion is that “there is little evidence to suggest that Plato expressed either the Narrow or Broad Achilles.” [pp.25-26]

Professor Nielsen’s champion for a first source is Plotinus, via Mendelssohn no less, intimating that since Mendelssohn cites Plotinus rather than Plato it must be the former who is the authentic originator. [ARP, p.23] But she neglects to mention that I discuss Plotinus at greater length than I do Plato and that I explicitly attribute to the great Neoplatonist not only credit for both the Narrow and the Broad Achilles’ (unity and immortality) but, in addition, I also even credit Plotinus for the Broadest Achilles, which consists of an argument for continuous personal identity based on the simplicity of the soul [ARA pp. 8-10].

But, beyond that and more importantly. Professor Nielsen indicates that my infatuation with A. O. Lovejoy’s commitment to unit-ideas, exemplified in his classic The Great Chain of Being, leads me to operate with a rather “eccentric and confused conception” of the Achilles. I think that’s a fair criticism to which I would like to respond in the following manner. The unit-idea is not the Achilles argument as a whole. The unit-idea is the premise. The assumption is that the soul, along with its predicates, accidents, attributes, or properties are all simple, immaterial, unextended (just like Kant’s verse and its constituent words). (Although, by the way, Henry More, believed the soul to be both immaterial and extended.) As I have tried to correct – and argue – in subsequent publications, the simplicity premise has been used for no less than seven different conclusions: immortality; unity; personal identity; epistemological and metaphysical idealism; immanent time-consciousness; the freedom of self-consciousness; and the immaterial nature of meanings and relations. The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments was published in 1974. Since then there have been some twenty or so articles and reprints dedicated to “my” Achilles, the last one appearing in 2009, and I have tried to correct the confusion between the Achilles as a premise and as an argument. Actually, soon after the publication of my book, I rechristened the study calling it the Simplicity Argument.

Possibly, ARP appears to commit a similar “eccentricity and confusion” by assuming “Premise 2: Only a simple, unified substance can unify representations”; therefore the soul is (1) immortal (Broad Achilles) and (2) a unity (Narrow Achilles).

Let me also say this. Whether or not even the Broad Achilles can be attributed to Plato, it’s clearly the case that the second argument in the Phaedo is not considered by Plato as the strongest proof. Rather, Plato thinks that the strongest demonstration for an afterlife relies on the eternal synthetic a priori relation between the Forms of Life and Soul, which is modeled on an analogous connection established in the Meno between color and extension/shape [see Mijuskovic, “The Synthetic A Priori in Plato,” Dialogue, May, 1970]. But, of course, Plato invokes various arguments for immortality in different dialogues.

Also, I might suggest that in my mind there is a strong connection between Plato’s definition of the activity of thought, described as the soul’s internal dialogue with itself, and the ubiquitous reflexive, self-conscious paradigm of awareness that fuels the unity of consciousness claim, a model that is shared by Plato, Aristotle—see especially Aristotle’s characterization of the Unmoved Mover in the Metaphysics–Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and many, many others. It isn’t only that consciousness is a unity; it’s that it is first and foremost a mental activity.

Finally, I think it’s a bit of a stretch for Professor Nielsen to usher in a discussion of the Wooden Horse metaphor from the Theaetetus, which deals with the five bodily senses as opposed to the obviously more relevant immaterial or simple concepts and their resultant unification in judgments. Certainly, this has little or no resemblance to Kant’s Second Paralogism argument. And I’m not sure what insight it provides in furthering the discussion. And, in fact, on ARA page 7, I state the following: “In the Republic and Phaedrus, of course, Plato refers to the tri-partite nature of the soul and this at once brings up the problem of reconciling the simplicity of the soul with its compositeness.”

The reason I dismissed pursuing the topic any further is because at least two of the parts of the soul are physical. And I conclude by saying: “But at least this much is certain; according to Plato, in order for the soul to be able to grasp the essence of the immaterial forms, in knowledge, it must itself share in the attribute of immateriality. However, whether from this Plato also believed that the soul’s simplicity followed is not clear” [ARA, p. 7].

Theories of Consciousness, Therapy and Loneliness

Over twenty years later Mijuskovic picks up where he left off with the last chapter of Contingent Immaterialism, in an article for the International Journal of Philosophical Practice – a journal of the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling and Psychotherapy – entitled “Theories of Consciousness, Therapy, and Loneliness,” he discusses the clinical or therapeutic ramifications of the therapist’s philosophy of mind. A materialist philosophy typically leads the therapist to use chemical or medicinal solutions; whereas, an immaterialist philosophy focuses upon counseling and treating the patient’s mental state before resulting to medicinal treatment. This article is a beautiful look at the interplay between the philosophical and practical sides of the simplicity argument. Individual lives have been drastically affected by the materialistic philosophy of mind held by the majority of psychiatrists and psychologists. Mijuskovic advocates more holistic approaches in addition to medicine to provide a more well-rounded practice in our clinics.

The entire work is available for download here.