Hume on Space (and Time)

“Hume on Space (and Time)” explores the way in which Hume’s presentation of space-time depends upon Leibniz’s. Hume’s interaction with the Leibniz-Clark correspondence challenges him to address the simplicity argument in regard to his view on the immateriality of space.  Mijuskovic concludes:

As Leibniz had insisted that our thoughts are ultimately simple, unified, and indivisible (because the monads are), so Hume held that the visible and tangible points, which have no dimensions, are ultimately qualitative simples and ideal, that is, mental existences. [1]

Although Hume did not agree about the nature of the mind as a unified, simple substance, his presentation of thoughts illustrates the strength of the simplicity argument’s premise embraced by both sides of the larger debate regarding the nature of mind. He cannot overlook the fact the objects (thoughts) of the bundle of perceptions (mind) do not possess an extended or material existence. This concession makes Hume’s philosophy of mind, in part, a candidate for study in the history of the simplicity argument.

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s